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Abstract 
 
  A global economy-wide model (GTAP) is used to go beyond estimating how 
GM crop variety adoption affects adopting and non-adopting economies, with or 
without policy responses to this technology, by indicating effects also on real incomes 
of farmers. The results suggest the EU moratorium on imports of GM food helps EU 
farmers even though it requires them to forego the productivity boost they could 
receive from the new biotechnology. An estimate of the cost of that EU moratorium to 
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Since their commercial take-off in 1996, the sowing of genetically modified (GM) 
crop varieties has spread rapidly and currently accounts for one-quarter of the global 
land area planted to maize, soybean and canola and cotton, and 4.3 per cent of all 
arable land. But just three countries dominate global production of GM food products, 
namely Argentina, Canada and the United States (US), where with minimal regulatory 
impediments the GM shares of those crops now average more than 60 per cent (James 
2003). By contrast, the European Union (EU) imposed a moratorium on the 
production and importation of GM food products, which has discouraged other 
countries from accepting this new biotechnology. Since 1998 when the EU 
implemented its moratorium, GM-adopting countries have lost EU market share to 
GM-free suppliers, particularly Brazil for maize and soybean and Australia and 
Central Europe in the case of canola (Foster, Berry and Hogan 2003).  
  Those differing standards and the trade-diverting (not to mention innovation-
stifling) effects of the EU’s policy choice raise the question of whether this new 
agricultural biotechnology is beneficial for adopting countries and for global welfare. 
Using a two-country partial equilibrium theoretical model, Lapan and Moschini 
(2004) show there are circumstances in which the adopting countries could be worse 
off and the EU – and even EU farmers – may be better off via changes in international 
food prices resulting from adoption in face of the EU moratorium.   
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  In this paper we go beyond the Lapan and Moschini study in the sense of 
making use of a multi-country, applied general equilibrium model to quantify the 
effects of GM adoption by some countries without and with consumer and trade 
policy reactions by other countries. We also go beyond earlier empirical analyses 
(e.g., Nielsen and Anderson 2001; van Meijl and van Tongeren 2002; Nielsen, 
Robinson and Theirfelder 2003; Huang et al. 2004), by providing empirical estimates 
of the effects within countries on real incomes of farm households of GM standards. 
This is done not just to explore empirically the above theoretical proposition by Lapan 
and Moschini, but also to test the political economy proposition that the EU standards 
benefit EU farmers even though those regulations deny them the opportunity to adopt 
GM technologies.  
The conventional explanation for the US-EU difference in GM regulations is 
that Europeans care more about the natural environment than do Americans, and trust 
their food safety regulators less. While not denying either of those possibilities, we 
explore additional possible explanations in the first section of the paper. These are 
tested empirically using a modified version of the GTAP data and simulation model of 
the global economy, described in the second section. Results are presented in the third 
section. The final section draws out the political economy implications of these 
results.  
 
Why do national GM policies diverge? 
 
The precautionary stance taken by EU towards GM food is not based on 
scientific evidence. On the contrary, it is inconsistent with earlier statements made by 
the EU scientific community (European Commission 2001), and with the report 
recently commissioned by the UK government (King 2003, p. 23). This suggests that  
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policy makers may have alternative or at least additional motives than the promotion 
of food safety and environmental health. Political economic theories suggest 
governments respond to both national public interests and private interest group 
pressures. Apart from differences in environmental preferences or in consumer trust in 
food safety authorities, the EU may have banned GM products to enhance the EU’s 
monopoly power in international food markets (the regional optimal tariff argument, 
resurrected recently by Bagwell and Staiger 1999). Although this motivation seems 
unlikely given that the EU already maintains high import barriers to many farm 
products and is foregoing the productivity gains of the new biotechnology, we test it 
empirically.  
Private interest group theory (Grossman and Helpman 1995) offers a more 
likely explanation for the policy differences. Anti-GM protest groups and 
biotechnology firms are active lobby groups on both sides of the Atlantic, so are 
unlikely to be the main explanation for the policy difference. The most obvious other 
interest group with an economic stake in these policies is the farm lobby.  
US farmers clearly have a strong interest in a low degree of GM food 
regulation, so that they can exploit the new technology before it is disseminated 
beyond the US. The interests of EU farmers, however, are less clear-cut. Had they 
been allowed to adopt, EU crop farmers would have benefited very little to date 
because the first-available GM food crops (maize and soybean) are of minor direct 
importance to them.
1 In addition, because their landscape is much more densely 
settled, buffer zoning costs more per hectare of GM crop there than in broad-acre 
landscapes such as in the US. True, the EU livestock sector is almost as big as that of 
the US, and its producers have an interest in lower costs of feedstuffs. But given that 
North America and Argentina have already adopted GM technology, EU food  
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producers may be more competitive than GM adopters in their own and in third-
country markets if consumers in those markets are sufficiently GM-averse, and if 
these markets require compliance with strict labelling regulations for GM foods. If 
those strict labelling standards also applied to feed ingredients (as is intended in the 
EU from now on), then EU livestock producers also could support anti-GM policies 
since they are unlikely to benefit as much from the GM technology as maize-and-
soybean-intensive North American livestock producers.  
 
The GTAP model modifications and scenarios 
To test the theory that farm interest groups have an economic stake in GM 
policies empirically, we use a well-received empirical model of the global economy 
(the GTAP model) to examine the effects on national and farmer welfare of some 
countries adopting the new GMO technology without and then with government and 
consumer responses in other countries. The Version 5.4 database used for these 
applications (Dimaranan and McDougall 2002) draws on the global economic 
structures and trade flows of 1997, just prior to the EU moratorium on GM crop 
varieties.
2    
The simulations use a standard, long-run, neoclassical GTAP closure. This 
closure is characterized by perfect competition in all markets, flexible exchange rates 
and fixed endowments of labour, capital, land and natural resources. One outcome of 
this specification is that wages are flexible and the labour market operates at full 
employment. Investment funds are allocated among regions to equate the change in 




In our GTAP simulations we assume 45 per cent of US and Canadian coarse 
grain production is GM. When they are assumed to adopt, all Latin American 
countries and Australia adopt GM coarse grains at two-thirds the level of the US (i.e., 
30 per cent of coarse grain production is GM) while all other countries adopt GM 
coarse grains at one-third the level of US adoption (i.e., 15 per cent of coarse grain 
production is GM). For oilseeds, we assume that 75 per cent of oilseed production in 
the US, Canada, Argentina and Brazil is GM. Again Other Latin American countries 
and Australia are assumed to adopt at two-thirds the extent of the major adopters and 
the remaining regions adopt at one-third the extent of the major adopters. This 
relatively low adoption rate in the case of the EU reflects the assumption that buffer 
zoning would cost more per hectare for densely settled farming regions than is the 
case in the broadacre American setting. 
The adopting sectors are each sub-divided into GM and non-GM varieties, and 
an output-augmenting, Hicks-neutral productivity shock is implemented on the GM 
varieties of these commodities to capture their higher productivity. This assumption 
leads to a uniform reduction in the level of primary factors inputs needed per unit of 
GM output.
3 When a region does not adopt GM technologies, no regional factor 
productivity shock is included and no distinction is made between GM and non-GM 
production in these regions. In the constant-elasticity-of-substitution production nest, 
producers choose first between imported and domestic inputs according to the 
model’s Armington elasticities, and then choose whether or not to use GM or non-GM 




In order to capture consumer aversion to GM products, two changes are made 
to the traditional GTAP demand structure. First, elasticities of substitution between 
GM and non-GM products in the European Union, Australia and New Zealand where 
consumers are GM-averse are set at low levels to capture the perceived low 
substitutability of these products. In addition, preference shift parameters are included 
to capture the group of consumers in some countries that, because of food safety 
and/or environmental concerns, refuses to consume GM crops regardless of their 
price. In such cases a 25 per cent reduction in final demand for output of crops that 
may contain GMOs is assumed, following Nielsen and Anderson (2001). 
 
Factor ownership 
We examine the effects on intra-regional distribution of income by dividing the 
economy into three groups of households: farmers, unskilled labourers, and owners of 
human and other capital. Income of each group comes from a combination of factors. 
Farm households earn income from farm and non-farm activities. The existing GTAP 
database provides information about the availability and use of land, unskilled labour, 
skilled labour, other natural resources and other capital in the agricultural sector, and 
likewise in other sectors. Non-farm activities of farm households are assumed to earn 
income from factors in the same proportion as activities conducted by the typical 
urban capital-owning household. Hence factor shares for farm households are a 
weighted sum of factor shares used in agricultural production and the factor income 
shares of capital owners.
4 The shares of farm household income from non-farm 
activities are assumed to be 90 per cent in Japan and Korea, 50 per cent in China and 
the EU, 35 per cent in US and Canada, 25 per cent in Australia, New Zealand, and  
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Eastern Europe, and 20 per cent in the remaining developing countries. The 
expenditure shares are assumed to be the same for all households, so real household 
incomes are calculated simply by deflating by the consumer price index. 
 
Simulations 
Several sets of simulations are considered below to address the questions posed in the 
introduction. We look at the impacts of GM adoption by the US, Canada and 
Argentina first, without and then with policy reactions in other countries. Then we add 
the EU to the list of adopters to explore the tradeoffs for the EU between productivity 
growth via GM adoption and the benefits of remaining GM-free given the prior move 
to adopt in the Americas. Following Stone et al. (2002), these model simulations 
assume that total factor productivity is higher for GM than for non-GM varieties by 6 
per cent for oilseeds and 7.5 per cent for coarse grains; in the later cases of rice and 
wheat, a modest 5 per cent productivity difference is assumed to provide a 
conservative estimate of the impact of adoption of these two crops.
5 
The base case is compared with several alternative scenarios. One involves an 
EU moratorium on GM imports from Argentina, the US and Canada, where it is 
assumed there is no segregation between GM and non-GM products and therefore the 
EU import ban (modelled as a prohibitive tariff) is imposed on all coarse grains and 
oilseeds from those three GM adopters. Another scenario assumes the EU, Japan and 
Korea implement labelling policies that allow consumers to choose between non-GM 
products and those that may contain GM content. In this option, diehard consumers in 
the EU, Korea and Japan avoid consuming coarse grains and oilseeds. (This is 
modelled as a 25 per cent reduction in final consumption of coarse grains and oilseeds 
in those countries.) In a third alternative scenario the EU abandons its stand against  
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GM products while all other countries remain non-adopters. A final scenario assumes 
that the EU's acceptance of GM products would induce the rest of the world to adopt 
GM varieties of coarse grains and oilseeds as well.  
 
Model results 
The aggregate economic welfare effects of these various cases are summarized 
in Table 1 for all scenarios. Table 2 presents the welfare effects for the first two 
scenarios disaggregated into three parts: resource allocative efficiency effects, 
changes in the region’s terms of trade, and technological change.  
The global benefits of the first group’s GM adoption is substantial (US$2.3 
billion per year) if there are no adverse reactions elsewhere. The major importing 
regions of the EU and Northeast Asia share about one-quarter of the global benefits, 
while Brazil, Australia, New Zealand and Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa experience 
small welfare declines (because of an adverse change in their terms of trade and, in 
the case of Brazil, a reduction in resource allocative efficiency). In the absence of any 
adverse reactions abroad, the GM-adopting countries expand their output and net 
exports of coarse grains and oilseeds (and meat) while the opposite happens in the rest 
of the world. Consumption of these products expands in all regions because they are 
now cheaper, but especially in the GM-adopting regions since in this model the 
Armington assumption ensures that imported products are an imperfect substitute for 
domestically produced products. 
When the EU imposes its moratorium, however, this is similar to an increase 
in farm protection there and causes the EU to be worse off by $3.1 billion per year 
(less whatever value EU consumers place on having avoided consuming GM 
products). In addition this policy leads to a one-third reduction in the gain to GM- 
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adopting North America, a welfare improvement for Brazil, and a slight welfare 
decline for food-importing regions of the rest of the world. However, when the EU 
moratorium is imposed on imports from GM-adopting countries, the international 
prices of coarse grains and oilseeds fall more – and GM-adopting countries slightly 
reduce their output of these crops. In Europe, output expands because the import ban 
drives up domestic prices of these products. 
Suppose the EU provided labelling information and allowed individual EU 
consumers to respond according to their preferences. If one-quarter of them simply 
avoided these products because they may contain GMOs, the welfare effects are 
almost the same as in the base case, because even though there is less EU 
consumption there is also less protected production in high-cost Europe and therefore 
less resource waste. Alternatively, if the EU allowed GM adoption, it would gain 
more from its own productivity gains. In this case,  net importers of these products 
elsewhere in the world would also experience welfare improvement, while net 
exporters of coarse grains and oilseeds (both GM adopters and non-adopters) would 
experience welfare declines. The net global gains would be just seven per cent more 
than in the base case because coarse grains and oilseeds are minor crops in the EU 
compared with North America, assuming the EU moratorium has no impact on the 
GM policies of other countries. 
However, if the rest of the world became uninhibited about adopting GM 
varieties of these crops, global welfare would increase by nearly twice as much as it 
would when just North America and Argentina adopt. While the EU too would gain 
more in this scenario because of improved terms of trade, almost all of the extra 
global gains would be enjoyed by developing countries (final column of Table 1).  
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The cost of the EU’s policy stance can be thought of as in the range of the 
difference between columns four and two and the difference between columns five 
and two of Table 1, depending on how much one believes the EU’s stance is 
determining the rest of the world’s reluctance to adopt GM varieties of these crops. 
For the EU that cost range is (406 + 3145 =) $3551 million to (595 + 3145 =) $3740 
million per year, while for the world as a whole the range is (2.43+ 1.24 =) $3.67 
billion to (4.05+ 1.24 =) $5.29 billion per year. 
 In at least two respects the estimate of a $5.3 billion welfare improvement 
greatly understates the global welfare cost of the EU’s policy. First, the second 
scenario in Table 1 (the EU moratorium) ignores the fact that the EU’s stance has 
already induced some other countries to also impose similar moratoria. Sri Lanka was 
perhaps the first developing country to ban the production and importation of GM 
foods. In 2001 China did the same (with some relaxation in 2002), having been denied 
access to the EU for its soy sauce exports because they may have been produced using 
GM soybeans imported by China from the US. If that China moratorium was included 
along with the EU moratorium, the global welfare loss in scenario 2 is -$2.5 billion 
instead of -$1.2 billion per year. And second, these comparative static simulations 
ignore the dynamic impacts of on-going GM food research and development activities 
and the considerable reductions in investment in this area influenced by the EU’s 
extreme policy stance.  
 
What do the results suggest about GM policy drivers? 
 Two political economy questions were raised earlier in the paper. Is the EU policy 
response to GM adoption in the Americas consistent with a regional public-interest 
strategy aimed at capturing terms of trade benefits for the EU; and are the policy  
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responses by the EU consistent with the theory of special-interest politics whereby 
farmers benefit from the policy chosen even if the national economy as a whole is 
worse off?  
 
EU terms of trade  
The terms of trade for the EU improve when the EU implements a moratorium 
in response to North America and Argentina adoption of GM coarse grains and 
oilseeds. However, the extent of farm protection provided by the moratorium is far 
more than is optimal in terms of boosting EU economic welfare through improved 
terms of trade. The comparison shows that EU welfare is $3.4 billion per year lower 
because of the moratorium: the loss in allocative efficiency of $3.6 billion greatly 
outweighs the gain from the terms of trade change of just $0.2 billion (compare the 
upper and lower parts of Table 2). 
A comparison of the final two columns of Table 1 reveals that if the EU 
abandoned its moratorium and allowed domestic production and imports of GM 
coarse grains and oilseeds, the EU would gain from its own actions. If this policy 
change induced other countries to also allow GM production of those crops, the EU 
welfare would improve by an additional (595 – 406 =) $189 million per year, due to a 
further improvement in the EU’s terms of trade. Clearly these results do not support 
the view that an improvement in the terms of trade is the primary reason for the EU’s 
protectionist response to GM adoption by others. 
 
The farm lobby 
The alternative explanation suggested earlier is that the EU farm lobby stands 
to gain from the current policy regime although farmers forego access to a lower-cost  
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technology. The effects on real farm household incomes, summarized in Table 3, are 
indeed consistent with this political economy hypothesis. The first three rows of Table 
3 show Argentinean farmers' incomes increase slightly and farmers' income in the US 
and Canada decreases only slightly as a result of their adoption of GM varieties. Even 
though the productivity gains are more than offset by the price declines for North 
American farmers (since they are such a dominant part of the global market for maize 
and soybean), if any small sub-set of those farmers did not adopt they would be even 
worse off by suffering the price decline but not enjoying the productivity growth.  
Note from columns two and three of Table 3 that American farmer income 
declines greatly when the EU imposes a moratorium, but declines only a small 
amount when the EU allows consumers to avoid GM products by implementing a 
GM-labelling regime. EU farmers' income, on the other hand, declines slightly if there 
is GM adoption in the Americas, but increases when the EU imposes a moratorium on 
American imports. That advantage disappears if either EU consumers are allowed to 
choose for themselves or if EU farmers are allowed to adopt GM varieties (in which 
case the price decline evidently fully offsets the productivity gain for them – see 
columns 1 to 4 of row 8 of Table 3).  
In short, the EU ban on production and imports of products that may contain 
GMOs harms American farmers' and benefits EU farmers, compared with the EU’s 
alternatives of embracing the new technology or allowing EU consumers the right to 
choose. These results are thus not inconsistent with the hypothesis that farm interest 
group influence GM policy in these regions.
6 
 
Implications for the global trading system and developing countries   
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These findings have worrying implications for the global trading system. If it 
is in the interests of farmers in food-importing countries of Europe and elsewhere to 
forego adopting this new biotechnology in order to reduce their competitive 
disadvantage vis a vis more-efficient export-oriented producers, then those protected 
producers have incentives to join with consumer and environmental groups and lobby 
for tough GMO standards. It would not even be in the interests of Cairns Group 
farmers in Australia and New Zealand to oppose that stance.
7 These standards could 
replace traditional forms of government assistance to agriculture, which current trade 
negotiations are seeking to dismantle in agricultural-protectionist countries. Not only 
would that negate the benefits of negotiating lower farm support programs in the 
current Doha round of WTO negotiations, but it could increase friction in the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body.  
For developing countries, our results show that the EU moratorium benefits 
food-importers (and Japan and Korea), because of an improvement in their terms of 
trade. However, the above analysis does not take into account that moratoria will slow 
the investment in agricultural biotechnology, and thus reduce future market and 
technological spillovers to developing countries. Furthermore, future generations of 
GM products are likely to provide health and nutritional benefits to consumers, as in 
GM rice enhanced with Vitamin A. The costs of delaying investments in those GM 
technologies will fall heavily on the world’s poor consumers (Anderson, Jackson and 
Nielsen 2004).  
In contrast to trade moratoria, labelling policies potentially provide a 
mechanism for accommodating consumers’ preferences for non-GM food, although 
not without some cost to the global economy in terms of necessary segregation and 
identity preservation systems. Their adoption in place of the current EU ban would  
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provide both rich-country and poor-country consumers with greater choice than they 
currently have. However, more empirical modelling research is required to include the 
costs of segregating GM-inclusive and GM-free products and to explore the incidence 
of the identity preservation cost between GM and non-GM farmers, between farmers 
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Table 1: Economic welfare effects of GM coarse grain and oilseed adoption by 
various regions 
 
      (equivalent variation in income, US$ million) 
 
 

















United States  939 628 936  928  897
Canada 72 7 67  70  65
Argentina 312 247 310  307  287
Brazil -36 256 -46  -53  317
Other Latin America  125 184 130  128  356
Australia -9 -4 -10  -10  2
New Zealand  -5 2 -5  -5  -6
EU-15 267 -3145 326  406  595
Eastern Europe  7 -10 9  8  35
China 107 111 113  110  235
India 0 3 1  0  252
Japan + Korea  322 341 178  335  430
Other Asia  36 44 39  37  134
South Africa  3 7 4  4  9
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  -2 14 -2  -2  60
Rest of World  152 75 169  167  380
WORLD 2290 -1243 2219  2429  4047
 
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results.  
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Table 2:  Economic welfare decomposition of GM coarse grain and oilseed 
adoption by the US, Canada and Argentina 
(% changes) 
 
(a) With no policy responses 
 










          
United States    70 -368 1204 939 
Canada   17 -43 101 72 
Argentina   19 -50 338 312 
Brazil   -18 -14 0 -36 
Other Latin America  70 55 0 125 
Australia   2 -11 0 -9 
New Zealand    0 -4 0 -5 
EU-15   181 102 0 267 
Eastern Europe  5 -1 0 7 
China   85 27 0 107 
India   3 -3 0 0 
Japan + Korea  98 239 0 322 
Other Asia    17 19 0 36 
South Africa    3 1 0 3 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa   0 -2 0 -2 
Rest of World    98 54 0 152 
WORLD   647 0 1643 2290 
 
 
(b) With EU moratorium response 
 










          
United States    192 -690 1153 628 
Canada   17 -111 96 7 
Argentina   5 -89 330 247 
Brazil   100 125 0 256 
Other Latin America  79 106 0 184 
Australia   3 -7 0 -4 
New Zealand    0 2 0 2 
EU-15   -3431 288 0 -3145 
Eastern Europe  -15 1 0 -10 
China   85 28 0 111 
India   -3 6 0 3 
Japan + Korea  98 250 0 341 
Other Asia    13 33 0 44 
South Africa    2 5 0 7 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa   1 12 0 15 
Rest of World    33 42 0 75 
WORLD   -2821 -1 1579 -1243 
 
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results.  
Table 3:  Percentage change in farm household real income in selected regions, 
various GM adoption and policy response scenarios 
 
 
  US, Canada, and Argentina adopt  US, Canada, 
Argentina and 
EU adopt












United States  -0.18 -0.36 -0.20 -0.19
Canada -0.26 -0.57 -0.28 -0.27
Argentina 0.01 -0.10 0.00 0.00
Brazil -0.00 0.15 -0.01 -0.02
Other Latin America  -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07
Australia -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
New Zealand  -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.03
EU-15 -0.03 0.74 -0.05 -0.05
Eastern Europe  -0.03 0.08 -0.03 -0.03
China -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
India 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.03
Japan + Korea  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Other Asia  -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
South Africa  -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.04
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.01
Rest of World  -0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.04
 
Source: Drawing on the authors’ GTAP model simulation results. 
  
 
                                                 
1 The EU produces only 6 per cent of the world’s maize and 1 per cent of its soybeans, 
in contrast to the US whose shares exceed 40 per cent. 
2 Hertel (1998) for comprehensive model documentation. The model is solved with 
GEMPACK software described in Harrison and Pearson (1996). 
3 For studies that differentiate the degrees of factor/input saving, see van Meijl and 
van Tongeren (2002).  We ignore that complication because it makes little difference 
to the results being analysed here. 
4 This measure of impact on farmer income is different from the partial equilibrium 
measure of producer surplus used by, for example, Lindner and Jarrett (1978) who 
show that even with a completely inelastic demand curve a parallel shift (but not a 
pivotal shift) downwards in the supply curve will not reduce producer surplus. The 
measure of farm household income change used here can generate a loss for producers 
partly because it is a general equilibrium measure that also captures off-farm earnings 
of farm households, but also because the technology shock only applies to the GM 
varieties which then have to compete with the (sometimes preferred) non-GM 
varieties of that crop. Hence the price-depressing impact can more than offset the 
effect of the productivity improvement on profits of GM adopters. 
5  See Marra, Pardey and Alston (2002) for empirical evidence on the positive impacts 
on yields and profits from adopting GM crop varieties, primarily in the United States. 
Even in the case of Roundup Ready soybean where some areas initially experienced 
slight reductions in yield, the lower herbicide costs and the time freed up have been 
more than sufficient compensation to lead to adoption. 
6 Further support for that hypothesis was found in another scenario, not reported here, 
in which the remaining OECD countries also ban coarse grain and oilseed imports  
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from the adopting countries. In that scenario EU farmers benefit even more, giving 
them further reason to support EU consumer and environmental groups’ opposition to 
GM products. Farmers in Japan and Korea, by contrast, are worse off in that scenario. 
This is because they produce almost no feedgrains or oilseeds and so their large 
import-competing livestock sectors have a strong interest in obtaining the lowest-
priced feedstuffs from abroad (and hence in preventing tough GM legislation), 
otherwise they will be less able to compete with foreign livestock producers. The 
much-less-stringent GM consumer policies in Japan and Korea are thus also 
consistent with the special-interest hypothesis. 
7 Unreported simulations show ANZ would gain very slightly in net economic welfare 
terms from joining the GM adopters of these crops instead of losing very slightly from 
abstaining, but the difference is less than $1 per capita per year. Even if that was 
sufficient to offset the negative value ANZ consumers place on not knowing if they 
may be consuming GM products, real ANZ farm household income would not 
improve from GM adoption regardless of whether the EU moratorium remains (see 
rows 6 and 7 of Table 3). Hence one should not expect ANZ farmers to be pushing 
hard for rapid approval of GM production until consumer concerns fade. Nor are there 
any huge ANZ-owned biotech firms developing the technology and hence lobbying 
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